This paper analyzes the e¤ects of public information in a perfect competition trading model populated by asymmetriclly informed short-horizon investors who have di¤erent private information precisions. We …rst show that information asymmetry reduces the amount of private information revealed by price in equilibrium (i.e., price informativeness) and can lead to multiple linear equilibria. We then demonstrate that the presence of both information asymmetry and short horizons provides a channel through which public information in ‡uences price informativeness and equilibrium uniqueness. Speci…cally, public information improves price informativeness only when it is of high quality (precision). When the quality of public information is low, multiple equilibria can arise and increasing public information precision can reduce price informativeness.
Introduction
This paper studies the role of public information in aggregating disperse private information in stock markets. Speci…cally, in a two-period overlapping generation trading model with perfect competition, we study how public information impacts the price information aggregation process when investors have short investment horizons and are asymmetrically privately informed (i.e., investors observe heterogeneous private information with di¤erent precision levels). The notion that prices can aggregate and reveal private information is a cornerstone for well functioning markets (Hayek, 1945) . Aggregation occurs via the trading process when investors condition their trades on the information available to them (Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980; Glosten and Milgrom, 1985; Kyle, 1985) . Price informativeness, which refers to the amount of private information revealed by prices that is otherwise not available to the general public, directly contributes to the overall stock price e¢ ciency. 1 More price informativeness reduces investors'uncertainty about …rms'fundamentals and the risk premia they demand, which can in turn lower …rms' costs of capital (Easley and O'Hara, 2004; Lambert, Leuz and Verrecchia, 2007) . It can also provide corporate managers with additional information to make better investment decisions. 2 That prices contain valuable private information also underlies proposals for policy makers and regulators to base their actions on prices.
3 1 Throughout the paper, we use price e¢ ciency and market e¢ ciency interchangeably, both referring to the ability of stock prices to re ‡ect all fundamental-relevant information, including both public and private information. We focus on prices' ability to reveal private information because unlike public information (which is by de…nition a common knowledge) private information may not be available to the economy without the price aggregation process. 2 See, e.g., Holmstrom and Tirole (1993) , Dow and Gorton (1997) , Subrahmanyan and Titman (1999), Goldstein and Gumbel (2008) , and Dow, Goldstein and Gumbel (2011) , for theoretical models. See, e.g., It is widely believed that public information plays a signi…cant role in stock market e¢ -ciency. One of the channels for public information to a¤ect price e¢ ciency, as suggested by conventional wisdom, is to level the playing …eld by alleviating the adverse impact of information asymmetry among investors. 4 However, prior theoretical studies have shown that in stock markets with perfect competition, price informativeness depends only on the average precision of investors'private information: neither information asymmetry nor public information a¤ects the equilibrium price informativeness (Verrecchia, 1982) . That is, while more public information improves price e¢ ciency (by moving price closer to the fundamentals), it does not operate via the channel of information asymmetry. This point was recently highlighted in the context of multiple assets by Easley and O'Hara (2004) and Lambert, Leuz and Verrecchia (2012). 5 A key assumption behind the irrelevance of information asymmetry and public information for price informativeness is that investors'investment horizons are the same as the operating horizon of the …rms that they own. 6 That is, investors hold stocks until the …rms' …nal liquidation dates. This assumption can be restrictive to the extent that investors trade for various reasons and often close their positions before the …nal liquidation dates, either because they are subject to exogenous liquidity shocks, or because they are simply outlived by the …rms they invest in. In this paper, we relax this assumption and study the impact of 4 Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) study a setting where public information reduces the adverse impact of information asymmetry on liquidity. We focus on how public information reduces the adverse impact of information asymmetry on price e¢ ciency. 5 The e¤ect of information asymmetry on price informativeness is also at the center of the debate over insider trading. Proponents for insider trading argue that it allows prices to be more informative; whereas opponents argue that it reduces price informativeness by reducing market liquidity. See Easterbrook and Fischel (1991) . Models of perfect competition (such as the one we study) assume that traders are price takers and therefore liquidity is not a concern. 6 Another key assumption is perfect competition. It is well known that information asymmetry matters in models with imperfect competition (e.g., Kyle, 1985; Glosten and Milgrom, 1985; Kyle, 1989; Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991; and Lambert and Verrecchia, 2011) .
public information when equilibrium prices are determined by privately informed investors with short investment horizons. Speci…cally, we extend the two-period version of Allen, Morris and Shin (2006) to allow information asymmetry among investors. 7 As in Allen, et al. (2006) , investors in our model observe their own private information; unlike Allen, et al. (2006) , the quality (precision) of investors'private information di¤ers. Thus, our model nests as a special case the standard notion of information asymmetry where some investors observe private information (that is, the precision of their private information is positive)
while others observe only public information and observe no private information (that is, the precision of their private information is zero).
Our …rst …nding is that with short-horizon investors, information asymmetry unambiguously lowers price informativeness by exacerbating the information loss due to short investment horizons. Unlike long-horizon investors, short-horizon investors face the uncertainty of the next period price, as opposed to the uncertainty of the fundamentals. Their trades are thus less sensitive to their private information about the fundamentals than long-horizon investors, which reduces price informativeness. We …nd that information asymmetry exacerbates the information loss. The additional loss arises because the sensitivity of investors' trading to their private information is not uniformly reduced when investors have di¤erent levels of private information precision. Whereas less informed investors (i.e. those with less precise private information) do not reduce their sensitivities as much (because their sensitivities are not high to begin with), the reduction is more pronounced among more informed investors (i.e. those with more precise private information). Because price informativeness depends on the average of individual sensitivities, it follows from the Jensen's Inequality that the average of individual sensitivities is lower than the sensitivity of the average investor.
This leads to an aggregation loss in price informativeness, above and beyond the loss induced 7 Similar models have been studied in Grundy and McNichols (1989) and Brown and Jennings (1989) , and recently in Gao (2008) . None of these papers allow investors to have di¤erential precisions in their private information.
by short horizons. Furthermore, we show that when there is a unique linear equilibrium, the more severe information asymmetry is (as captured by a mean-preserving spread of the distribution of the precision levels across investors), the larger the aggregation loss, hence the lower the equilibrium price informativeness.
Our second …nding is that information asymmetry among short-horizon investors may
give rise to multiple linear equilibria in situations where the equilibrium is otherwise unique.
The existence of multiple equilibria may sound counter-intuitive as the conventional wisdom suggests uniqueness in equilibrium (Gao, 2008) . We show that short horizons can generate an "endogenous uncertainty e¤ect" in that the sensitivity of short horizon investors'trades to their private information endogenously a¤ects the uncertainty of their future payo¤, which in turn a¤ects how sensitive their trades should be to their private information. This endogenous uncertainty e¤ect creates a positive feedback loop that could give rise to self-ful…lling multiple equilibria. More importantly, information asymmetry magni…es the endogenous uncertainty e¤ect. The intuition relies on the insight that investors with di¤erent levels of precision respond to the endogenous uncertainty e¤ect to a di¤erent degree. We show that when the degree of information asymmetry is strong enough or when public information is not precise enough, the endogenous uncertainty e¤ect can overwhelm the conventional wisdom and result in multiple equilibria.
Together, these two …ndings identify a mechanism through which information asymmetry a¤ects the price formation process. Our main analyses of the role of public information build on this mechanism and …nd that public information a¤ects the information aggregation process via its impact on this mechanism. Speci…cally, we …nd that public information a¤ects price informativeness only when both information asymmetry and short horizons are present. 8 Furthermore, the e¤ect is ambiguous: when the quality (precision) of public in- 8 With only short horizons but no information asymmetry, public information does not a¤ect price informativeness. Neither does public information a¤ect price informativeness with only information asymmetry but no short horizons (Verrecchia, 1982; Easley and O'Hara, 2004; and Lambert et al., 2012) .
formation is high enough, more public information improves price informativeness; however, when the quality of public information is su¢ ciently low, more public information can lower equilibrium price informativeness. We show that the e¤ect of public information operates by a¤ecting the dispersion in the sensitivities of individual investors' trades to private information. When public information is very precise, all investors, regardless of their private information precisions, place relatively small weight (close to 0 when public information is extremely precise) on their private information, resulting in less dispersion in sensitivities and limiting the loss of informativeness due to information asymmetry. In this case, increasing public information further reduces the dispersion in sensitivities thus improving price informativeness. When public information is very imprecise, all investors place relatively large weight on private information (close to 1 when public information is extremely imprecise). In this case, increasing public information would increase dispersion in sensitivities, leading to more information aggregation loss. The result is a U-shaped relationship between the quality of public information and price informativeness.
We also …nd that the quality of public information plays an important role in equilibrium uniqueness. Speci…cally, we show a su¢ cient condition for equilibrium uniqueness is that public information is precise enough; and a necessary condition for multiple equilibria is that the public information precision is low enough. The intuition is related to the "endogenous uncertainty e¤ect" discussed earlier, which links the second period price to investors'perception of price informativeness in the …rst period. High quality public information eliminates multiple equilibria by weakening this link, in that when public information is very precise, the second period price will be mainly determined by public information, as opposed to determined by private information, thus reducing the impact of self-ful…lling expectations.
Only when public information is su¢ ciently noisy is there su¢ cient room for investors'selfful…lling expectations to a¤ect prices and generate multiple equilibria.
To further relate to the prior literature, we analyze the impact of information asymmetry and public information on cost of capital. Cost of capital refers to the discount in price investors demand to hold risky assets. Information asymmetry and public information, via their impact on price informativeness, in ‡uence investors'average information precision which in turn determines costs of capital. We show that holding the average private information precision in the economy constant, costs of capital are higher with more information asymmetry and with less precise public information.
Our paper contributes to the literature by generating new insights regarding the role of public information. It identi…es a mechanism in which public information in ‡uences the ability of price to aggregate private information held by informed investors that otherwise would not be available to the general public, a key aspect of the overall price e¢ ciency.
In the prior literature, public information improves price e¢ ciency by directly providing more information about the fundamental without a¤ecting price informativeness (Easley and O'Hara, 2004; Lambert et al., 2007 Lambert et al., , 2012 . In our setting, public information takes on an additional role by a¤ecting the adverse impact of information asymmetry on price informativeness. As such, our paper provides a new perspective for the claim that more public disclosure helps level the playing …eld and improves market e¢ ciency. Furthermore, public information in our model can help stabilize the market and reduce excess volatility in that precise public information can eliminate multiple equilibria.
At the same time, our analyses reveal a potential dark side of public information in that small improvement on low quality public information may reduce price informativeness.
While this message echoes that from Morris and Shin (2002) who also caution against the potential detrimental e¤ect of public information, the underlying mechanism for our results is di¤erent from that in Morris and Shin (2002 we analyze how public information a¤ects price's ability to aggregate private information.
Ceteris paribus, more price informativeness will increase price e¢ ciency, while the reverse is not true. In contrast to Gao (2008) where public information improves price e¢ ciency without a¤ecting price informativeness, we show that allowing information asymmetry endows public information a crucial role in price informativeness.
In what follows, we …rst set up and solve the model in Section 2. Sections 3 and 4 contain the main analyses on the e¤ects of information asymmetry and public information on price informativeness and equilibrium uniqueness. Section 5 extends the analysis to study the joint e¤ects of information asymmetry and public information on cost of capital and section 6 concludes. Gao (2008) . Unlike these prior studies, however, our model allows the quality/precision of individual investors' private information to di¤er. We brie ‡y describe the model below.
There are two periods (denoted by t = 1 and t = 2). In each period, a continuum of investors with a unit measure (indexed by i 2 [0; 1]) choose their investments through trading between a risky asset (stock) and a riskless asset (cash) in a competitive market. Without loss of generality, the rate of return for cash is normalized to one. The per share liquidation value of the risky asset, , is random and will be realized at the end of the second period.
Investors do not observe the average per capita supply of the risky asset (denoted as s t ) but understand that s t N s t ; period, and unwind their positions when the terminal value is realized at the end of the second period.
The common prior on is that it is di¤usely distributed over the real line. Both generations of investors observe one common public signal z from the following distribution:
Each investor also observes a private signal x ti prior to trading:
where
; cov (" ti ; " t{ ) = 0, 8t; i 6 ={; and cov (" ti ; "t{) = 0, 8t 6 =t; i;{:
Conditional on , private signals are independent across investors and periods. The precision of the private signal is ti for investor i in the t th generation. We assume in each period,
We assume the cross-sectional distribution of i is identical and independent across periods. This assumption is without of loss of generality: as will be shown shortly, the distribution of i among second generation investors does not a¤ect the main results.
With CARA utility functions and normal distributions, the standard result shows that the optimal demand for the risky asset by a …rst generation investor i is
Similarly, the demand by a second generation investor is
In both expressions, the subscripts denote that expectations are taken with respect to the information set ti of investor i in the t th generation. Speci…cally, 1i fz; p 1 ; x 1i g where p 1
11 Equivalently, both generations have the common prior that is normally distributed with mean z and
is the equilibrium price of the risky asset from the …rst round of trading, and x 1i is investor i's private information signal. Similarly, 2i fz;
is not an element of 2i
because it is privately observed by the …rst generation investor i; although second generation investors will glean some information about the x 1i s from p 1 . Also note that the payo¤ for second generation investors of holding one share of the risk asset is its liquidation value , whereas the payo¤ for the …rst generation is the risky asset's price from the second round of trading, p 2 .
Solution 2.2.1 Equilibrium and measure of price informativeness
The equilibrium concept and solution procedures used here are fairly standard. For brevity,
we highlight the parts pertinent to our analysis and refer readers to Allen, Morris and Shin (2006) for a detailed account. Following the literature, we focus on linear equilibria where period t price is given by
and
A key feature of (3) and (4) is that prices are a linear function of . This happens because the equilibrium prices are determined by the aggregate supply and demand for the risky asset. As will be shown next, individual investors'demand for the risky asset is linear in their private signals, and the aggregate demand is an average of all private signals, which, by the Law of Large Numbers, equals . Investors understand this feature and will take into account the information in price about in their trades. Since the stock price in each trading round is a¤ected by two random variables ( and the supply shock s t ), investors view the observed price as a noisy signal of where the noise comes from the supply shock.
Speci…cally, rearrange (3) and (4) to get ). Conditional on observing the pre-trading public information (i.e., fzg for the …rst generation and fz; p 1 g for the second generation), observing p t provides the same information content regarding as observing P t .
Thus, the informativeness of price can be measured by the inverse of the variance term as:
The higher t is, the more informative p t is with respect to . Since t is exogenously given, we are interested in the endogenous part of t : the ratio of
Note that price informativeness is di¤erent from the concept of market/price e¢ ciency, which measures the extent that price re ‡ects all value relevant information, including both private and public information. Gao (2008) focuses on market e¢ ciency and quanti…es it as the reciprocal of the mean-squared error between the …rm's fundamental and its stock price.
Everything else equal, more informative price improves market e¢ ciency while the reverse is not true. This is because price can be close to the fundamental from incorporating public information alone without re ‡ecting any private information. In contrast, price informativeness measures private information conveyed by price that is not otherwise available to the public.
Price informativeness in the second period
Since the second generation investors hold the stock until is realized, they trade based on their expectations of and the equilibrium is determined similarly as that in a standard one-period model. This is con…rmed and characterized below as Lemma 1.
Lemma 1: For a given p 1 and 1 , there is a unique linear equilibrium for the second period where price is given by (4) with
2 , M = + 1 + 2 + , and
Proof. See the Appendix of Allen, Morris and Shin (2006).
2 , which implies that holding the average of private information precision constant, price informativeness in period 2 does not depend on how the precision of investors' private information di¤ers from each other. This is the same conclusion as that from a standard one-period model (Verrecchia, 1982) . It is not surprising since second period investors hold assets till maturity and thus are in fact long-term investors, as are the investors in one-period models. In what follows, we make two comments on the intuition and implication in order to set the stage for later discussions.
First is the intuition. In a noisy rational expectations model, stock price becomes informative because it aggregates investors'demand, which depends on investors'private information. Therefore, the degree of price informativeness depends on how sensitive investors' trades are to their private signals and equals the average of all investors'individual sensitivities in equilibrium. To see this, notice that the equilibrium p 2 is set to equalize the aggregate demand with the aggregate supply for every realization of the supply shock and liquation
Write (4) 
In other words, 2 is monotonically increasing in the average sensitivity of each individual's demand to his private signal.
Substitute
into the demand function D 2i from (2), we have
Substitute (9) into (8) shows that 2 depends only on the average precision and not on how i is distributed among investors. This is because the sensitivity is linear in the precision of investors'private information. The linearity arises because the denominator of E 2i ( ) is exactly cancelled out by the scaling factor ([V ar 2i ( )] 1 ) in the demand function.
The linearity of the sensitivity in i implies that a unit increase in i will be o¤set by a unit decrease in j . As long as the average 's is held constant, price informativeness does not change.
Second, it is worth pointing out that price informativeness does not depend on the precision of the public information (i.e., ). The result may appear counter-intuitive at the …rst glance, as more precise public information reduces investors'sensitivity to their private information, which would reduce price informativeness (recall
which is decreasing in ). However, more precise public information also reduces trader i's residual 12 Bond and Goldstein (2010) …rst introduce this intuitive illustration.
uncertainty about the risky return. This induces investors to trade more aggressively, which increases price informativeness (recall [V ar 2i ( )] 1 is increasing in ). In equilibrium, these two e¤ects exactly o¤set each other.
Price informativeness in the …rst period
The …rst period equilibrium can be solved in a similar fashion, except that the consumption value of the risky asset for …rst generation investors is now p 2 instead of . As a result, unlike second generation investors, …rst generation investors' trading sensitivities to their private information is no longer linear in the precision of their private information. To see this, substitute
into D 1i from (1). The sensitivity of investor 1i's demand to his private information is
Note that 1 i is the sensitivity if investor i had long horizon (i.e., where is his payo¤).
The e¤ect of short horizons is captured by the term
, which is in general a nonlinear function of i . The nonlinearity implies that the distribution of private information would matter in equilibrium.
Speci…cally, rewrite c 2 =
from Lemma 1 as
where is the average precision of investors'private information and the function r ( ) is de…ned as
Recall that + 1 + 2 + measures the precision of total information available to an investor with the private information precision who observes both p 1 and p 2 . Thus, r ( ) captures the proportion of this investor's total information that is contributed by his private information.
Substituting (11) and (13) into ( where the superscript LH stands for long horizon.
(ii) When investors have homogenous information precision (i.e., i = , for all i), there exists a unique linear equilibrium where the …rst period equilibrium price informativeness 1 is given by
(iii) When investors have heterogeneous information precision, the …rst period equilibrium price informativeness is (implicitly) determined by
where r ( i ) = consider two extreme cases. In the …rst case, an investor has i = 0 and hence optimally assigns zero weight to his private information, regardless of his investment horizon. In the second case, consider an investor with = 1. If this investor is a long-horizon investor, he will take an in…nite position (i.e. maximum sensitivity) whenever p 1 6 = because he has no residual uncertainty about his payo¤. However, if he is a short-horizon investor and has to close his position before is realized, he faces an uncertain second period price and hence no longer wishes to take an in…nite position even when p 1 6 = , resulting in a signi…cant reduction in the sensitivity of his trade to his private information. Since price informativeness is an average of all individual sensitivities, more reduction by better informed investors leads to overall reduction in price informativeness.
Mechanically, the e¤ect of information asymmetry can be completely summarized by
is a concave function of i , by the Jensen's
where the equality holds if and only if i = for all i. Thus asym 1 < sym as long as i 6 = j for some i 6 = j. Obviously, the larger the
r( ) term is, the less information is lost in the price aggregation process and the higher price informativeness is. As such, we refer to
r( ) as the (inverse of) aggregation loss.
To generalize Proposition 1, we …rst de…ne the degree of information asymmetry.
De…nition: Let F ( i ) and G ( i ) be two distribution functions of i . We say the degree of information asymmetry among investors is higher under
Since the average private precision plays an important role in the analysis as well, a mean-preserving spread helps isolate the mean e¤ect of i (i.e., ) from the dispersion e¤ect of i . Corollary 1 follows directly from the concavity property of r ( i ). Due to concavity, if a distribution of i , F ( i ), is a mean preserving spread of G ( i ), then for every 1 , the right hand side of (16) is strictly smaller under F than under G. Further more, as will be discussed in the next section, if there exists a unique linear equilibrium under G, the slope of the right hand side of (16) at the equilibrium has to be less than 1, otherwise there would be at least one more equilibrium. Thus, it must be that any price informativeness generated under F must be strictly less than that under G.
Corollary 1 Let

E¤ect of information asymmetry on equilibrium uniqueness
In addition to reducing the equilibrium price informativeness, information asymmetry can also give rise to multiple linear equilibria. To start, note that (15) shows that with no information asymmetry, the equilibrium is unique, as the right hand side of (15) does not depend on the equilibrium sym 1
. However, with information asymmetry, asym 1 appears on both sides of (16), raising the possibility of multiple equilibria. Speci…cally, de…ne the right hand side of (16) as a function of 1 as below: The existence of multiple equilibria may sound counter-intuitive as conventional wisdom suggests uniqueness in equilibrium. To see this, start with a linear equilibrium. If all investors deviate by conjecturing that price is more informative than the existing equilibrium level, they would rely less on their private information and more on price relative to the existing equilibrium. In standard models with long horizons and no information asymmetry, such a deviation would not be self-ful…lling as lower sensitivity toward private information would result in lower price informativeness, contradicting investors'conjecture.
However, the conventional wisdom doesn't take into account that short-horizon investors' payo¤ depends on the second period price, which endogenously depends on the conjectured …rst period price informativeness. This in turn gives rise to an "endogenous uncertainty e¤ect": when the perceived …rst period price informativeness goes up, …rst generation investors will perceive the second period price to be less uncertain. Intuitively, this is because second generation investors (who determine the second period price) can resolve more uncertainty from a more informed …rst period price and thus have more capacity to absorb random supply shocks in the second period, making the second period price less sensitive to supply shocks and hence more predictable from the …rst generation's perspective. 13 The lower ex ante uncertainty induces …rst generation investors to trade more aggressively on their private information, which increases the equilibrium …rst period price informativeness, con…rming the conjecture. More pertinent to our analysis here is that less informed investors do not increase their trading sensitivities as much because their private information is not that precise to begin with. In contrast, more informed investors trade more aggressively, and 13 To see this, note that in Lemma 1 the equilibrium coe¢ cient for the supply shock in the second period
which is decreasing in 1 . That is, everything else equal, the ex ante variance of the second period price decreases as the …rst period price informativeness goes up.
rely more on their private information. That is, information asymmetry magni…es the endogenous uncertainty e¤ect. When the degree of information asymmetry is strong enough, the endogenous uncertainty e¤ect can overwhelm the standard e¤ect and result in higher price informativeness in another equilibrium.
Alternatively, note that the e¤ect of information asymmetry can be completely captured by the ratio of
r( ) . This ratio decreases in the degree of concavity of r ( i ) =
which can be loosely captured by the second order derivative of r ( i ) with respect to i :
How the degree of r ( i )'s concavity changes with 1 can be captured by 
In Panel C of Figure 1 equilibrium #2 is unstable, while the other two equilibria are stable.
Corollary 1 can be generalized to the case of multiple equilibria. For every stable equilibrium, a slight perturbation to the distribution of in the sense of a mean preserving spread will reduce the equilibrium price informativeness of that equilibrium. 14 This can be shown by noting that information asymmetry a¤ects the equilibrium 1 only through the aggregation loss term
r( ) . A mean-preserving spread of simply moves the entire R ( 1 ) curve down and therefore reduces the equilibrium 1 for every stable 1 : As shown in Figure 1 , when information asymmetry is increased, all stable equilibria shift to strictly lower price informativeness solutions, while the unstable equilibrium in Panel C moves to a higher price informativeness solution.
E¤ects of public information
In this section, we analyze the e¤ects of public information on price informativeness and equilibrium uniqueness, respectively.
E¤ect of public information on price informativeness
Parts (i) and (ii) of Proposition 1 show that with either long-horizon investors or private information of homogeneous precision alone, public information is independent of the price aggregation mechanism in that public information ( ) does not a¤ect 1 . In contrast, Part (iii) of Proposition 1 demonstrates that for public information to impact price informativeness in our model it is necessary to have both information asymmetry and short horizons. 14 We implicitly assume that small changes in i 's distribution will not lead to a discontinuous jump in equilibrium.
The e¤ect of public information on the equilibrium price informativeness can be seen from (17) which shows that and 1 a¤ect R ( 1 ) only through their sum. That is, ceteris paribus, a unit change of has the same e¤ect on R ( 1 ) as a unit change of 1 in the same direction. Hence, increasing is equivalent to shifting the R ( 1 ) curve to the left in Figure 1 .
Consequently, increasing can either increase or decrease the equilibrium informativeness 1 depending on the sign of slope of R ( 1 ) at equilibrium (i.e.,
). Speci…cally, for any stable equilibrium where
2 (0; 1), increasing public information strictly improves price informativeness of that equilibrium. In contrast, for any stable equilibrium where
2 ( 1; 0), increasing public information strictly reduces price informativeness. Proposition 2 provides su¢ cient conditions under which increasing increases (reduces) price informativeness in the …rst period. in Proposition 1. It states that with homogeneous investors, public information has no e¤ect on the ability of price to aggregate and reveal private information. Proposition 2(ii) shows that when public information is precise enough, further increasing its precision on the margin can enable the …rst period price to better aggregate investors'private information. Public information a¤ects price informativeness by a¤ecting the degree of concavity in r ( i ), which determines the magnitude of the information aggregation loss as measured by (the inverse of)
Proposition 2 (i)
we have
> 0, if and only if is big.
That is, with more precise public information, the term r ( i ) becomes less concave and hence more private information can be assimilated into the price.
Conversely, Proposition 2(iii) demonstrates that when public information is not precise to begin with, further increasing its precision on the margin can reduce the …rst period price informativeness. This is because, as shown in (18), with less precise public information, the concavity in r ( i ) is increasing in and hence more private information is lost during the aggregation process. We also note that Proposition 2(iii) only speci…es a su¢ cient condition
In fact, the numerical example used in Figure 1B has min = 0 and shows that the equilibrium …rst period price informativeness decreases with public information precision.
Intuitively, information asymmetry a¤ects price informativeness due to the dispersion in sensitivities of individual investors'trades with respect to their private information: the higher the dispersion, the larger the aggregation loss that is due to information asymmetry. Public information enters the picture by a¤ecting the degree of dispersion in individual sensitivities. Speci…cally, when public information is very precise (imprecise), all investors, regardless of their private information precision, place a very small (large) weight, say, close to 0 (1) to their private information, hence leading to less dispersion, limiting the e¤ect of information asymmetry on the price formation process and reducing the price information aggregation loss. Only with moderately precise public information is there signi…cant dispersion in individual sensitivities. As a result, there can exist a U-shaped relationship between the quality of public information and price informativeness.
E¤ect of public information on equilibrium uniqueness
In addition to a¤ecting the …rst period equilibrium price informativeness, public information can also a¤ect equilibrium uniqueness. Note that a su¢ cient condition for a unique equilibrium is
To see this, observe that as becomes large, the ratio
r( ) in (16) approaches 1, and the right-hand-side of (16) does not vary much with 1 , which helps obtaining a unique equilibrium solution of 1 . The proof for Part (ii) of Proposition 2 shows that as long as is large enough,
. This is stated formally as Proposition 3 below.
Proposition 3
When is large enough, there exists a unique stable linear equilibrium.
Intuitively, multiple equilibria arise due to the "endogenous uncertainty e¤ect" in which the perceived uncertainty in the second period price is linked to the …rst generation's conjectured price informativeness in the …rst period. Precise public information eliminates multiple equilibria by weakening this link. Speci…cally, when public information is very precise, the second period price will primarily be driven by the public information regardless of the conjectured …rst period price informativeness. Only when public information is su¢ ciently noisy is there much room for investors'conjectured price informativeness to impact their demand, possibly leading to multiple equilibria.
An immediate implication of Proposition 3 is that a necessary condition for multiple linear equilibria to exist is that public information cannot be too precise. To illustrate this, consider a binary distribution of i 's, where i 2 f h ; l g with h = 100; l = 0;
Pr ( h ) = 0:01; 1 = 10; 2 = 1; 1 = 10; and 2 = 2: We have the following observation. Proof for Observation 1 (See the appendix for details.)
Observation 1 shows the possibility of a discontinuous e¤ect of public information on price. The discontinuity would take place if investors start in the least informative equilibrium whenever multiple equilibria exist. If public information becomes precise enough such that the equilibrium becomes unique, price would jump from the least informative equilibrium to the surviving equilibrium.
E¤ects of information asymmetry and public information on cost of capital
We now examine whether investors demand a higher discount due to information asymmetry.
Following the literature, we de…ne the price discount in period t as E ( Proof of Proposition 4 (See the appendix for details.)
As in a standard noisy rational expectations model, price discounts arise in our model to induce risk averse investors to hold the risky asset. The more information investors have regarding their …nal payo¤, the less uncertainty they face, and the lower the price discount they demand. Because second generation investors rely on the …rst period price as a source of information regarding the risk asset's liquidation payo¤, when price is less informative because of information asymmetry, they face more residual uncertainty about their payo¤, thus demanding a higher discount. This implies that information asymmetry in the …rst period increases price discount in the second period without directly a¤ecting the second period price informativeness (see Lemma 1).
More information asymmetry also contributes to a higher price discount in the …rst period. Decompose the …rst period discount as
As …rst generation investors anticipate that they would have to sell the asset to second generation investors at a discount, the second period price discount (which is increasing in the degree of information asymmetry) is carried forward into the …rst period price, giving rise to the …rst term in the right hand side of the expression above. The second term is the expected discount from the second period price, which is the …nal payo¤ for …rst generation investors.
More information asymmetry reduces the …rst period price informativeness regarding . Since p 2 is a function of , more information asymmetry in turn translates into more uncertainty regarding p 2 and consequently a higher discount from p 2 . Thus, both terms in E (
increase with more information asymmetry. The next proposition establishes the e¤ect of public information on price discounts.
Proposition 5
Let be an interval of such that the equilibrium is unique and stable for all 2 . The price discount in each period decreases with for all 2 .
Proof of Proposition 5 (See the appendix for details.)
Increasing the public information precision has two e¤ects on price discounts. The …rst is a direct e¤ect in that more accurate public information directly reduces investors' uncertainty about the liquidation value of the risky asset. This e¤ect is the driving force behind standard one-period models (with or without information asymmetry, e.g., Lambert, et al. (2007 Lambert, et al. ( , 2012 ) and two-period models with no information asymmetry (Gao, 2008 ).
In our setting where both information asymmetry and short horizons are present, public information has a second indirect e¤ect via its e¤ect on the …rst period price informativeness.
While the indirect e¤ect is ambiguous in general as shown in Proposition 2, Proposition 5
shows that in any stable unique equilibrium the direct e¤ect dominates the indirect e¤ect so that increasing the precision of public information unambiguously decreases price discounts on the margin, consistent with the …ndings in Bhattacharya, et al. (2012) .
Finally, we illustrate these results with several numerical examples. All numerical examples assume a binary distribution of i where i = h with probability A and i = l with probability 1 A. In all examples, we keep constant by varying A and h l . Thus Pr ( l ) = 1 A captures the degree of information asymmetry because when 1 A increases, h l has to increase to keep constant, thus increasing the degree of information asymmetry in the sense of a mean preserving spread. value). 15 Parameter values are chosen such that all equilibria in Figure 3B are stable. Panel A of Figure 3B shows that while public information increases price informativeness, the increase is not continuous. The discontinuity takes place 15 The plots would be similar to those in Figure 3A if the most informative equilibrium was chosen at all times.
when public information becomes precise enough that multiple equilibria are no longer possible. The threshold at which multiple equilibria are eliminated (the discontinuity point)
is increasing in the degree of information asymmetry, suggesting that with more information asymmetry among investors, public information needs to be more precise to eliminate multiple equilibria. Similarly, Panels C and D show that the e¤ect of public information on costs of capital is also discontinuous. There exists a threshold point where a small increase in public information can result in signi…cant drop in …rms'costs of capital. This is expected,
given that both price informativeness and public information help reduce cost of capital, and
given the discontinuous e¤ect of public information on price informativeness.
Conclusion
The paper analyzes the e¤ects of public information in a perfect competition trading model populated by asymmetrically informed short-horizon investors who have di¤erent levels of private information precision. We …rst show that information asymmetry reduces price informativeness and can lead to multiple linear equilibria, where price informativeness refers to the amount of private information revealed by price in equilibrium. We then demonstrate that the presence of both information asymmetry and short horizons provides a channel through which public information in ‡uences price informativeness and equilibrium uniqueness. Speci…cally, public information improves price informativeness only when it is of high quality (precision). When the quality of public information is low, multiple equilibria can arise and increasing public information precision can reduce price informativeness. 
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1 Substitute (10) and (11) into (1), and apply the market clearing
Since E 1i ( ) =
Substitute in P 1
and collect terms. We have
and therefore
Thus, the informativeness of p 1 is given by
where the …nal step follows after substituting c 2 from (13). For completeness, one can solve the pricing functions by setting up a system of equations where coe¢ cient in (3) are equal to those in (19) . These coe¢ cients are
where the coe¢ cients for p 2 are given in Lemma 1. Clearly, for every solution of 1 , there is a unique set of equilibrium prices. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2 Part (i) is immediate by inspecting (15).
For part (ii), notice that
. Apply implicit function theorem to the equilibrium condition for When + 2 > 2 max , holding other exogenous parameters constant, we have
Substitute these bounds into
, we have
Thus, as long as is large enough,
will be less than 1, and
follows. Finally,
2 (0; 1) also implies that the equilibrium is stable.
For Part (iii), note
2 is concave in i . Note that (20) is negative if
Thus, when
2 is concave in i . Next, note only through their sum, an increase in would lead to a leftward shift of R ( 1 ).
Hence, as is obvious from the …gure, increasing would make the two least informative equilibria converge toward each other and disappear altogether when is su¢ ciently big, while the most informative equilibrium would always exist. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4
Utilizing the expression for p 1 derived in the proof of Proposition 1, under G ( i ) we obtain Thus, the second period price discount
Since 1 (F ) < 1 (G) by Corollary 1, the second period price discount is higher under F than under G. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5
By the proof of Proposition 4, the …rst period price discount is E ( p 1 j ) = e 1 s 1 + f 1 s 2 . Notice that and 1 impact e 1 and e 2 only via their sum + 1 . Speci…cally, the larger + 1 , the smaller e 1 and e 2 , and the smaller the …rst period price discount. Thus, 
